League of NationsInternationalist Exhibitionism: The League of Nations at the New York World’s Fair, 1939–1940, in Jonas Brendebach, Martin Herzer, and Heidi J. S. Tworek (eds.), International Organizations and the Media in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Exorbitant Expectations (New York: Routledge, 2018), pp. 91-116

In 1939 and 1940, a total of 2.1 million visitors passed through the League of Nations Pavilion at the New York World’s Fair. As war broke out in Europe, what was the League — widely seen as dying — doing erecting a 100-foot tall building in Flushing, Queens?  This article explains how public legitimacy is crucial to international institutions in a world of sovereign states. It shows that the League tried to recast itself in the late 1930s, promoting a technical internationalism that downplayed its failure to prevent war. It demonstrates how that process was a public one, involving cultural diplomacy on a monumental scale. It argues, most importantly, that this process was above all intended to make clear that the League was a product of American traditions, of American statecraft, of American ideals. But as wars raged, the Pavilion flopped. Artistically ignored, it was left to turn derelict, unvisited, a forgotten presence in an empty corner of the grounds.

This volume was reviewed on H-Diplo.


Screen Shot 2018-10-17 at 8.02.39 PMDiplomatic History After the Big Bang: Using Computational Methods to Explore the Infinite Archive (with Matthew Connelly), in Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan (eds.), Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 74-101

Facing an “infinite archive” of digitized and born-digital documents — up to two billion emails were sent each year by the Hillary Clinton State Department — how are historians of U.S. foreign relations to cope? Arguing that we face both an profound challenge and a remarkable opportunity, and developed in collaboration with computer scientists and statisticians at Columbia University’s History Lab, this article shows how computational tools can be used to extend, rather than replace, historians’ traditional methods. Outlining techniques such as traffic analysis, topic modeling, and authorship attribution, it explores the promise of big data — and warns of its perils.

This volume was reviewed on H-Diplo.


Screen Shot 2018-10-17 at 8.21.57 PMRealism and Malarkey: Henry Kissinger, the State Department, and Domestic Consensus, in Journal of Cold War Studies 17 (2015), pp. 184-219

After the turmoil of Vietnam, Henry Kissinger and the State Department tried to reconstruct a public consensus on foreign policy, and bring it behind détente with the Soviet Union. While scholars have shown that Kissinger tried to do this by making a series of philosophical speeches in 1975 and 1976, this article is the first to show just how quixotic that effort was. To find out why Kissinger’s message seemed not to be getting through, the State Department set up “town meetings” in five cities, asking for public input into foreign policy. What they found horrified them — a rejection of Kissinger, of détente, of realism, of post-Vietnam foreign policy in general. A consensus, if it could be put back together, would have to come around more moralistic conceptions of the U.S. in the world than Kissinger was ever prepared to offer.


JFKWHP-AR6334-BThe Peace Corps in US Foreign Relations and Church-State PoliticsHistorical Journal 58 (2015), pp. 245-273

Historians tend to think of the Peace Corps, founded by the Kennedy Administration in 1961, as a symbol of a new, modern, development-oriented foreign policy, secular and striving. But this article shows that it was, in part, a response to the spiritual cold war fostered by Kennedy’s predecessors. Often described in explicitly religious — and explicitly Catholic — language by its supports, the Corps drew on the heritage of missionary and church-service groups, and even intended to contract with them to do its work. But as Catholic organizations were most visibly interested in receiving Peace Corps funds, this proved politically unworkable. The Kennedy Administration struggled to separate the secular and the sacred, as confused definitions of “religion” and a tough constitutional stance narrowed policy options. The Peace Corps fight shaped, and was shaped by, contemporary debates over church and state.